The Wrong Gameplan: Why the Minnesota Vikings\u27 Failure to Understand Minnesota\u27s Values Dooms Their Proposal for a New Stadium and How the Team Can Improve Its Future Chances by Dobson, Ian
William Mitchell Law Review
Volume 33 | Issue 1 Article 13
2006
The Wrong Gameplan: Why the Minnesota
Vikings' Failure to Understand Minnesota's Values
Dooms Their Proposal for a New Stadium and
How the Team Can Improve Its Future Chances
Ian Dobson
Follow this and additional works at: http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr
Part of the Entertainment, Arts, and Sports Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Reviews
and Journals at Mitchell Hamline Open Access. It has been accepted for
inclusion in William Mitchell Law Review by an authorized administrator
of Mitchell Hamline Open Access. For more information, please contact
sean.felhofer@mitchellhamline.edu.
© Mitchell Hamline School of Law
Recommended Citation
Dobson, Ian (2006) "The Wrong Gameplan: Why the Minnesota Vikings' Failure to Understand Minnesota's Values Dooms Their
Proposal for a New Stadium and How the Team Can Improve Its Future Chances," William Mitchell Law Review: Vol. 33: Iss. 1, Article
13.
Available at: http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol33/iss1/13
14. DOBSON - RC - REFORMAT 1.DOC 11/22/2006 10:48:57 AM 
 
485 
THE WRONG GAMEPLAN: WHY THE MINNESOTA 
VIKINGS’ FAILURE TO UNDERSTAND MINNESOTA’S 
VALUES DOOMS THEIR PROPOSAL FOR A NEW 




 I. INTRODUCTION ......................................................................... 485 
 II. OVERVIEW OF STADIUM FINANCING......................................... 488 
 A. History of Stadium Financing .............................................. 489 
 B. Reasons Teams Demand New Stadiums ............................... 490 
 C. Arguments Opposing Public Financing of Stadiums ............ 493 
 D. Arguments Supporting Public Financing of Stadiums .......... 498 
 III. HISTORY OF STADIUM FINANCING IN MINNESOTA .................. 502 
 A. Metropolitan Stadium .......................................................... 502 
 B. The Metrodome .................................................................... 504 
 IV. THE NEW VIKINGS STADIUM..................................................... 507 
 V. SOLUTION FOR THE LEGISLATIVE IMPASSE.............................. 510 
 A. The Vikings’ Current Failure to Win a Stadium................. 511 
 B. Suggestions for the Vikings’ Stadium Drive ....................... 514 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
On September 20, 2005, Minnesota Vikings owner Zygi Wilf 
announced an agreement with Anoka County to build a $675 
million stadium to be the new home of the Minnesota Vikings.1  
The Vikings sought $790 million in total funding for the project, 
because $115 million from the state would be designated for 
                                                 
       †  Law clerk to the Hon. Richard H. Kyle, United States District Judge for 
the District of Minnesota, J.D., 2006, University of St. Thomas School of Law.  My 
thanks to Ed Edmonds, Associate Dean for Library and Information Technology 
and Professor of Law, Kresge Law Library, Notre Dame Law School, for his 
comments during the preparation of this article. 
 1. Kevin Duchschere, Vikings Plan Draws Cheers and Concern, STAR TRIB. 
(Minneapolis), Sept. 21, 2005, at A1. 
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improvements in the transportation infrastructure surrounding the 
stadium.2  The proposal relied on nearly $510 million of public 
money: $280 million from Anoka County, and $230 million from 
the State of Minnesota.3  The Vikings agreed to invest $280 
million.4  Wilf had owned the Vikings for just a few months, having 
bought the team for $600 million5 after previous owner, Red 
McCombs, failed for years to get a new stadium or relocate the 
team to a different market.6 
McCombs’s difficulties in the stadium battles had little effect 
on Wilf’s ambition for a new facility.  Wilf began to push for a new 
Vikings stadium almost immediately after he purchased the 
Vikings.  Within moments of the National Football League (NFL) 
owners vote making him the new owner of the team, Wilf outlined 
his vision of a new open-air stadium for the Vikings.7  But what 
made the fight for a new stadium particularly difficult, beyond 
simply asking the Minnesota state government for several hundred 
million dollars for a football stadium, is that the Vikings were in 
stiff competition for a new stadium with the other two athletic 
tenants of the Metrodome, the Minnesota Twins baseball club and 
the University of Minnesota Gophers football program.8  The Twins 
had recently developed a proposal to build a baseball-only stadium 
in downtown Minneapolis, with no state contributions, while the 
                                                 
 2. Anoka County (MN) & Minnesota Vikings, Outline of Proposed Terms: New 
Stadium, http://www.co.anoka.mn.us/EconomicDevelopment/stadium/pdf/agre 
ement-between-anoka-county-vikings2.pdf (last visited Nov. 10, 2006).  These 
infrastructure projects include widening Interstate 35W in the suburbs north of 
Minneapolis and improving the on and off ramps near the stadium.  Id.  Currently, 
these road projects are not slated to be constructed until 2020 or later.  Id. 
 3. Id. 
 4. Id. 
 5. The NFL team owners approved the sale on May 26, 2005 by a 32–0 vote.  
Sid Hartman, Fowler Couldn’t Put Up Money, STAR TRIB. (Minneapolis), May 26, 
2005, at C3. 
 6. Red McCombs began advocating for a new stadium shortly after he 
bought the Vikings in 1998.  Kevin Seifert & Sid Hartman, Owner Has Concerns 
About Team On, Off Field, STAR TRIB. (Minneapolis), Oct. 19, 2001, at C6. 
 7. Jay Weiner, It’s Unanimous: Wilf Takes Purple Reins, STAR TRIB. 
(Minneapolis), May 26, 2005, at A1. 
 8. Minnesota Sports Facilities Commission, About the Hubert H. Humphrey 
Metrodome, http://www.msfc.com/about.cfm (last visited Nov. 10, 2006).  The 
Minnesota Twins have planned a $478 million stadium, of which Twins owner Carl 
Pohlad will pay $125 million and Hennepin County will fund the rest with a 0.15% 
sales tax. Patrice Relerford & Matt McKinney, 2005 Legislature: Stadiums, STAR TRIB. 
(Minneapolis), July 11, 2005, at A1.  The Minnesota Gophers have advocated for a 
$235 million stadium, 40% of which will be paid for by the state, with the rest 
being paid for by private donations, student fees and parking revenues.  Id. 
2
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University of Minnesota had been pushing for its own stadium, 
arguing that it was a public institution deserving of public dollars.9 
The Metrodome in Minneapolis was the last of the multi-
purpose stadiums developed during the 1970s and 1980s10 to 
minimize the headaches and financial commitment a city faces in 
building separate stadiums for different sports.  However, it 
appears to have caused the Twin Cities and Minnesota a serious 
problem.  Because there is only one stadium for the three athletic 
teams, the stadium has become outdated for all of its tenants at 
once, causing each team to demand a new facility. 
This paper focuses on the Vikings’ proposal for a new stadium 
in this competitive climate.  The Vikings, after starting at the end of 
the line in Minnesota’s stadium race, made a proposal that failed to 
gain the approval of the Minnesota State Legislature, leaving the 
team as the only tenant of the Metrodome without a new stadium 
in the works.11  The Vikings’ proposal has not only ignored 
Minnesota’s particular history of stadium financing, it has ignored 
most of the broader arguments for and against stadium financing.  
This paper attempts to illustrate how the Vikings broke from 
Minnesota’s evolving principles and attitudes toward stadium 
financing and to demonstrate how this break doomed the Vikings’ 
proposal for a stadium even as other stadium proposals succeeded.  
Additionally, this paper attempts to offer a solution, or at least a set 
of guiding principles, to Minnesota’s stadium conundrum. 
This paper first provides a broad overview of stadium financing 
in the United States by analyzing the historical context regarding 
                                                 
 9. Kevin Duchschere, Dane Smith & Mike Kaszuba, Vikings Have Deal for 
Blaine Stadium, STAR TRIB. (Minneapolis), Sept. 20, 2005, at A1. 
 10. The other multi-purpose stadiums built during this time were Riverfront 
Stadium in Cincinnati, built in 1970 (renamed Cinergy Field in 1997); the 
Astrodome in Houston, built in 1965; Veterans Stadium in Philadelphia, built in 
1971; Three Rivers Stadium in Pittsburgh, built in 1970; San Diego Stadium 
(renamed Jack Murphy Stadium in 1980, renamed Qualcomm Stadium in 1997) 
in San Diego, built in 1968; Candlestick Park in San Francisco (renamed 3Com 
Park in 1995, renamed Monster Park in 2004), built in 1960; and the Kingdome in 
Seattle, built in 1976.  See Roger G. Noll & Andrew Zimbalist, Build the Stadium—
Create the Jobs! in SPORTS, JOBS & TAXES: THE ECONOMIC IMPACT OF SPORTS TEAMS AND 
STADIUMS 30–48 (Roger G. Noll & Andrew Zimbalist eds., 1997). 
 11. In 2006, the Minnesota State Legislature passed bills to construct both a 
new football stadium for the University of Minnesota and a new baseball stadium 
for the Minnesota Twins.  See Act effective May 25, 2006, ch. 247, 2006 Minn. Sess. 
Law. Serv. 274, 274–78 (West) (providing funding and conditions for the 
University of Minnesota football stadium); Act effective May 27, 2006, ch. 257, 
2006 Minn. Sess. Law. Serv. 393, 393–406 (West) (providing for financing, 
construction, and operation of baseball stadium). 
3
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stadium financing and offering a discussion of the arguments for 
and against public financing.12 Next, it discusses the history of 
Minnesota’s professional athletic stadiums, specifically analyzing 
the reasons for constructing stadiums for the Twins and the Vikings 
and addressing the difficulties Minnesota encountered throughout 
the construction of these stadiums.13  The paper then outlines the 
Minnesota Vikings’ proposal for a new stadium, contrasting the 
current justifications for the stadium with the justifications for 
previous stadiums, all in the context of Minnesota’s current 
legislative discussions.14  Finally, the paper concludes by offering a 
solution to Minnesota’s current debate which encourages a 
discussion that relies on Minnesota’s traditional justifications for 
stadium financing.15 
II. OVERVIEW OF STADIUM FINANCING 
Stadium financing is a topic that has demanded the attention 
of entire books.16  The complex interplay of various funding 
mechanisms with local and federal tax codes, combined with 
economic and social justifications for and against public support of 
stadiums, makes the topic far too detailed for an all-encompassing 
discussion.  Therefore, this section attempts to explain the three 
areas most relevant to Minnesota’s decisions regarding stadium 
financing.  First, this section briefly addresses the history of stadium 
financing from the 1800s to the present day, focusing on the 
evolution of public opinion with regard to the public financing of 
stadiums.  Second, this section discusses the reasons professional 
sports teams request public funding to build stadiums.  Finally, this 
section discusses the major arguments, both economic and social, 
presented by those supporting and opposing the public financing 
of stadiums. 
                                                 
 12.  See infra Part II. 
 13.  See infra Part III. 
 14.  See infra Part IV. 
 15.  See infra Part V. 
 16. E.g. JOANNA CAGAN & NEIL DE MAUSE, FIELD OF SCHEMES: HOW THE GREAT 
STADIUM SWINDLE TURNS PUBLIC MONEY INTO PRIVATE PROFIT (1998); KEVIN J. 
DELANEY & RICK ECKSTEIN, PUBLIC DOLLARS, PRIVATE STADIUMS: THE BATTLE OVER 
BUILDING SPORTS STADIUMS (2003); Noll & Zimbalist, supra note 10; MARK S. 
ROSENTRAUB, MAJOR LEAGUE LOSERS: THE REAL COST OF SPORTS AND WHO’S PAYING 
FOR IT (1999). 
4
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A.  History of Stadium Financing 
Over the last century, diverse methods of stadium financing 
have emerged.  Since the 1800s, stadiums have been financed 
publicly, privately, or with combinations of both public and private 
money.17  Historically, more public dollars than private dollars have 
been spent on stadium construction.18  While public funds for 
stadium construction have always been questioned, it was not until 
the 1960s, when Americans were paying for an expensive war in 
Vietnam and dealing with massive social changes, that the public 
began to raise serious arguments about the priority of government 
funding of stadiums.19  Accordingly, the federal government began 
to encourage local governments to increase private sources of 
funding for the construction of stadiums.20  Interestingly, the 
federal government advanced its solution to increase private 
funding for stadiums by making interest on local bonds, used for 
stadium financing, tax deductible.21  Local government bonds 
would be more attractive, making it easier to finance public 
stadiums by selling bonds, and thereby pushing the expenses of the 
stadiums back onto the federal government.  
Consequently, public financing of stadiums was slow to 
deteriorate. In fact, although strong resentment to public financing 
of stadiums began in the 1960s, the public share of stadium 
construction rose to its high point during the 1970s, when 
approximately 90% of the cost of athletic stadiums was paid for by 
the public.22  But since the 1970s, public contributions to stadium 
construction have fallen to the point where during the 1990s, eight 
of the twenty-seven stadium projects actually had greater private 
than public investment and only seven stadiums were fully publicly 
funded.23 
Despite the fact that the public has taken on a smaller portion 
of the costs for new stadiums, the construction of new stadiums has 
                                                 
 17. Frank A. Mayer, III, Stadium Financing: Where We Are, How We Got Here, and 
Where We Are Going, 12 VILL. SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 195, 196 (2005) (citing MARTIN J. 
GREENBERG, THE STADIUM GAME 187 (2d ed. 2000)). 
 18. Id. at 211. 
 19. Id. at 197. 
 20. Id. 
 21. Andrew H. Goodman, The Public Financing of Professional Sports Stadiums: 
Policy and Practice, 9 SPORTS LAW. J. 173, 177–78 (2002). 
 22. Rodney D. Fort, Stadium Votes, Market Power and Politics, 30 U. TOL. L. REV. 
419, 427 (1999). 
 23. Id. 
5
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exploded over the last decade.  Of the 111 American professional 
sports franchises that existed in 2001, 102—or 92%—of the 
franchises had moved into either a new stadium or a significantly 
renovated stadium during the previous decade.24  Nearly all of the 
stadiums built within the last decade have had some form of public 
funding.25  Furthermore, between 2000 and 2005, twenty-one 
stadiums were built for the four major professional sports in 
America.26 
B. Reasons Teams Demand New Stadiums 
Although the specific reasons vary from sport to sport, owners 
of professional sports franchises, in all sports, have requested that 
governments build new stadiums for their teams to play in.  These 
requests stem from the revenue enhancements new stadiums 
provide to the teams. Stadium revenues have had a particularly 
large impact on the total revenue of Major League Baseball (MLB) 
teams. 27  In recent years, stadium revenues have doubled to reach 
about 20% of a team’s total revenue.28  Furthermore, NFL rules on 
revenue sharing make specific sources of revenue, such as profits 
from luxury box rentals, which are not shared, preferable to other 
sources of revenue for a franchise owner.29  This fosters a strong 
                                                 
 24. Brett Smith, If You Build It, Will They Come? The Relationship Between Public 
Financing of Sports Facilities and Quality of Life in America’s Cities, 7 GEO. PUB. POL’Y 
REV. 45, 45 (2001). 
 25. Id. 
 26. Mayer, supra note 17 at 195.  These stadiums include: Paul Brown 
Stadium, Cincinnati (football, 2000); Nationwide Arena, Columbus (hockey, 
2000); Comercia Park, Detroit (baseball, 2000); Enron Field, Houston (baseball, 
2000) (renamed Minute Maid Park in 2002); Pacific Bell Park, San Francisco 
(2000) (renamed SBC Park in 2004, renamed AT&T Park in 2006); Xcel Arena, St. 
Paul (hockey, 2000); American Airlines Center, Dallas (basketball and hockey, 
2001); Invesco Stadium at Mile High, Denver (football, 2001); Miller Park, 
Milwaukee (baseball, 2001); Heinz Field, Pittsburgh (football, 2001); PNC Park, 
Pittsburgh (baseball, 2001); Ford Field, Detroit (football, 2002); Gillette Stadium, 
Foxborough, MA (football, 2002); Reliant Stadium, Houston (football, 2002); SBC 
Arena, San Antonio (basketball, 2002) (renamed AT&T Center in 2006); 
Seahawks Stadium, Seattle (football, 2002) (renamed Qwest Field in 2004) ; Great 
American Ballpark, Cincinnati (baseball, 2003); Lincoln Financial Field, 
Philadelphia (football, 2003); Citizens Bank Park, Philadelphia (baseball, 2004); 
Petco Park, San Diego (baseball, 2004).  See id. at 195 n.1. 
 27. Fort, supra note 22, at 419. 
 28. Id. 
 29. See Clay Moorhead, Note, Revenue Sharing and the Salary Cap in the NFL: 
Perfecting the Balance Between NFL Socialism and Unrestrained Free-Trade, 8 VAND. J. 
ENT. & TECH. L. 641 (2006) (explaining current NFL revenue-sharing plan). 
6
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desire on the part of franchise owners not only for new stadiums 
but for single-purpose stadiums that can cater to both the inherent 
needs of particular sports and to the rules of each league, thereby 
maximizing an owner’s profit. 
Regarding the inherent differences between sports, the appeal 
of a single-purpose stadium stems from the enhanced sight lines it 
offers spectators.  This advantage is apparent when comparing 
football and baseball.  In football, where the bulk of the action 
takes place in the middle of a rectangular field, the least desirable 
seats are at the stadium’s end.  Therefore, football-only stadiums 
maximize the number of seats along the sidelines and minimize the 
number of seats at either end.30  By contrast, in baseball the 
majority of the action takes place in the diamond-shaped infield 
and at home plate.  Therefore, baseball-only stadiums are 
constructed with grandstands that extend out from behind home 
plate, minimizing the seats in the outfield areas.31  By providing 
these enhanced sight lines, owners are able to increase ticket prices 
to reflect the enhanced experience of attending a game.32 
New stadiums offer owners other revenue enhancements as 
well.  New stadium designs include more high-priced luxury suites 
and club seats.33  The designs provide larger, more accessible 
concession areas and are better suited for advertising displays, 
which can be sold.34  Team owners are able to make additional 
profits through the sale of the stadium’s naming rights, personal 
seat licenses, and parking spaces during games.35 
Furthermore, changes in stadium construction have had a 
particularly important impact in the NFL because of specific NFL 
rules regarding revenue sharing.  In the NFL, the home team 
shares 34% of its gate or ticket revenues with the guest team.36  But 
only a small portion of the revenue from luxury seating is 
designated as ticket revenue, meaning the bulk of the revenue 
from a luxury box is not shared.37  Also, unlike other forms of 
                                                 
 30. MICHAEL LEEDS & PETER VON ALLMEN, THE ECONOMICS OF SPORTS 173 
(Victoria Warneck, Roxanne Hoch & James Rignery eds., 2002). 
 31. Id. 
 32. Mayer, supra note 17, at 206. 
 33. Id. at 198–204. 
 34. Id. 
 35. Id. 
 36.  Jarrett Bell, Percentage of Revenue Shared Rises, USA TODAY, Mar. 29, 2006, at 
2C.  
 37. LEEDS & VON ALLMEN, supra note 30, at 80–81.  Only a small portion of the 
revenue from luxury suites is shared because only the price of the seat in a luxury 
7
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revenue, like national television broadcast fees, the NFL does not 
share luxury box revenue with players as part of the salary cap 
agreement, making owners much more interested in demanding 
new stadiums with more luxury boxes.38  Therefore, because of 
these advances in stadium construction and the relative speed with 
which these changes came to the market, some analysts believe any 
stadium over ten years old is now “economically obsolete.”39 
Beyond mere additional revenue, new stadiums are appealing 
to owners because they increase the value of the teams that play in 
them.  One high-profile example involves our current President, 
George W. Bush.  In 1989, Mr. Bush led a group of investors in 
purchasing the Texas Rangers for $83 million; Mr. Bush’s initial 
investment was $600,000.40  Mr. Bush was then successful in 
persuading both public officials and the general public to support a 
0.5% sales tax to finance a new ballpark for the Rangers.41  After 
the Rangers moved into their new stadium, The Ballpark at 
Arlington, the investor group sold the Rangers in 1998 to Tom 
Hicks for $250 million.42  Mr. Bush’s share of the proceeds was 
estimated at $16 million.43  Regardless of the potential for greater 
revenues, clearly an owner can profit with a new stadium by selling 
a team that is more valuable simply because it plays in a new venue. 
One final reason owners advocate for new stadiums is the 
belief that on-the-field performance is a direct result of a team’s 
financial condition.  Under this argument, a team that does better 
financially will be able to afford better players, coaches, personnel 
directors, etc., and thus, will be able to perform better on the field.  
This argument seems to have special importance in baseball, which 
has no salary cap,44 and the National Basketball Association (NBA), 
which has a soft salary cap that allows a team to exceed the league’s 
                                                                                                             
box counts as shared revenue under the rules. For example, a team that sells a 
luxury box with 20 seats for $100,000 a year may claim the value of each seat to be 
$100. Therefore, the value of the ticket sales would be $16,000 (20 seats X $100 X 
8 home games).  Therefore, the owner would get to keep $84,000 for the rent of 
the suite and split the $16,000 from the seats 60/40 with the guest team.  See id. at 
81. 
 38. Id. at 83. 
 39. Mayer, supra note 17, at 195. 
 40. Goodman, supra note 21, at 190. 
 41.  Id. at 190–91.  
 42.  Id. at 191.  
 43. Id. at 191. 
 44.  See Michael Felger, In a Dream World, Randy’d Be Dandy, BOSTON HERALD, 
Oct. 8, 2006, at B22 (stating that Major League Baseball has no salary cap).  
8
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maximum payroll under certain conditions.45  But even in the NFL, 
which has the most restrictive salary cap, the need for higher profits 
to improve on-the-field performance is arguably due to the cost of 
coaches, talent scouts, facilities, and other expenditures that are 
not counted under the salary cap, but nonetheless have a 
significant effect on a franchise’s on-the-field performance.46  Some 
have even suggested that the NFL may be the league where new 
stadiums are most important to the success of a team.  This is 
because NFL teams share more of their revenue with other teams 
than other professional sports.  Therefore, NFL teams attempt to 
expand revenues that are not shared in an effort to gain an 
economic advantage over their rivals and increase their talent level 
in these non-capped areas.47 
C. Arguments Opposing Public Financing of Stadiums 
Opposition to public financing of stadiums encompasses both 
economic and moral arguments.  One argument of opponents is 
that the economic gain touted by stadium proponents is nominal at 
best.  Opponents also argue any economic gain that is created by a 
stadium will flow to already-wealthy owners and athletes.  Finally, 
opponents argue that by funding a stadium that increases the 
number of club seats and luxury boxes, the consumption benefits 
of the improved stadium are provided to the wealthy who generally 
live in the suburban areas, while the poorer citizens from inside the 
city subsidize the stadium’s construction through local taxes. 
With respect to economic gain, opponents cite numerous 
studies that purport to show that stadium projects have had no 
                                                 
 45. Richard A. Kaplan, The NBA Luxury Tax Model: A Misguided Regulatory 
Regime, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 1615, 1644 (2004).  The notable exceptions to the NBA 
salary cap are the “Larry Bird” exception, which allows a team to exceed the salary 
cap in order to re-sign its own players, the $1 million exception, and the Mid-Level 
Salary Exception.  Id. 
 46. Todd Senkiewicz, Stadium and Arena Financing: Who Should Pay?, 8 SETON 
HALL J. SPORT L. 575, 576 (1998).  The contention that a team’s entire staff will 
significantly impact the team’s on-the-field performance is pertinent to the 
Minnesota Vikings organization.  The Vikings previous owner, Red McCombs, 
while advocating for a new stadium, consistently cut all personnel costs for the 
organization other than player salaries.  The Vikings had the lowest paid coaching 
staff in the NFL and a poorly staffed organization.  Patrick Reusse, Sold: The 
Vikings; NFL’s Bottom Line is Always About Money, STAR TRIB. (Minneapolis), May 26, 
2005, at C1; Kevin Seifert, Vikings Insider: Don’t Blame Red For 30 Years of Dysfunction, 
STAR TRIB. (Minneapolis), Oct. 23, 2005, at S2. 
 47. Senkiewicz, supra note 46, at 576. 
9
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positive economic effect on the communities that have built them.48  
One commonly cited study by the Congressional Research Service 
analyzed thirty stadium projects and concluded that twenty-seven of 
these projects had no discernable economic impact on the 
community while the other three projects actually had a negative 
effect on the community.49  Opponents of stadium financing 
explain these results by claiming that the money spent on 
attending sporting events is part of an individual’s disposable 
entertainment budget, which would be spent on other forms of 
entertainment if the stadium and the team that plays in the 
stadium were not available.50  Mark Rosentraub, a researcher who 
studies the impact of professional sports teams on communities, 
supports this belief, estimating that only between 12% and 34% of 
the attendance at a sporting event constitutes an actual increase in 
spending within the community.51 
Opponents also argue that the multiplier effect—the idea that 
money spent at the stadium will be circulated throughout the 
community and cause greater economic gain—which is commonly 
argued in support of stadium financing,52 is virtually nonexistent in 
professional athletics.53  First, they argue sports franchises simply do 
not employ enough people to create a substantial multiplier 
effect.54  Further, even the athletes, who take by far the largest 
portion of a franchise’s payroll, are likely to create a smaller 
                                                 
 48.  See, e.g., Senkiewicz, supra note 46, at 589 (“Despite the lofty numbers 
often cited by economic forecasters, an increasing number of studies from the 
federal government and independent researchers has shown that stadium deals 
are not economically beneficial to a community.” (citing William J. Donovan, 
Stadiums: Winners or Losers?, PROVIDENCE J.-BULL., Feb. 26, 1997, at A1)). 
 49. Id. at 589; DENNIS ZIMMERMAN, CONG. RESEARCH SERVICE, TAX-EXEMPT 
BONDS AND THE ECONOMICS OF PROFESSIONAL SPORTS STADIUMS (1996). 
 50. Mayer, supra note 17, at 215. 
 51. Senkiewicz, supra note 46, at 589. 
 52. LEEDS & VON ALLMEN, supra note 30, at 199. 
 53.  See, e.g., Joseph Spiers, Are Pro Sports Teams Worth It? Cities Are Paying Out 
Billions to Woo Pro Sports Franchises, But Despite the Hoopla, Teams Don’t Do Much for 
Local Economies, FORTUNE, Jan. 15, 1996, at 29 (providing a critic’s contention that 
professional sports teams do not cause net beneficial economic growth for local 
economies).  
 54. In 1992, Mark Rosentraub studied 161 counties in the United States with 
300,000 residents or more.  Senkiewicz, supra note 46, at 591.  After doing so, he 
concluded that professional sports teams accounted for only 0.06% of the private 
workforce in these counties and only 0.10% of the county’s payroll.  Id.  These 
discoveries led Rosentraub to determine that professional sports franchises were 
actually small- to medium-sized firms.  Id.  See also ROSENTRAUB, supra note 16 
(providing further analysis of Rosentraub’s work following his 1992 study). 
10
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multiplier effect than individuals employed in other industries.55  
Professional athletes, who are traded and move with more 
frequency than individuals employed in other areas, tend not to 
live in the cities of the teams for which they play.  Therefore, a high 
proportion of their income is spent outside of the team’s city.  
Additionally, an athlete’s career is much shorter than most other 
professions, meaning athletes have a strong incentive to save a 
higher proportion of their income for the future, which further 
reduces the multiplier effect in the community.56  Finally, with 
respect to increased jobs unrelated to athletes and coaches, 
opponents of public financing for stadiums contend that the 
majority of these jobs are seasonal, temporary, and low-income, and 
consequently not worth the large public expenditures of building a 
new stadium.57 
Opponents also argue the spillover effect—the economic 
benefit generated from additional spending around the stadium—
is small58 and has actually been minimized, sometimes purposefully, 
in the designs of the newest stadiums.59  First, they argue that the 
spillover effect is small due to the low number of people who 
                                                 
 55. A similar argument that does not address the multiplier effect is that this 
concentration of wealth among athletes and owners has a negative impact on job 
creation because other leisure businesses, which would employ more middle-class 
individuals with the same amount of money being spent, are forced to compete 
with sports franchises for individuals’ disposable income.  Robert A. Baade & Allen 
R. Sanderson, The Employment Effect of Teams and Sports Facilities, in SPORTS, JOBS & 
TAXES: THE ECONOMIC IMPACT OF SPORTS TEAMS AND STADIUMS 92, 99–100 (Roger G. 
Noll & Andrew Zimbalist eds., 1997). 
 56. LEEDS & VON ALLMEN, supra note 30, at 199–202. 
 57. Senkiewicz, supra note 46, at 592. By way of comparison, Alabama was 
criticized for spending $300 million dollars in 1993 to subsidize the construction 
of a manufacturing plant for Mercedes that would employ 1500 people, a cost of 
$200,000 per job.  Baade & Sanderson, supra note 55, at 99–101.  But only three 
years earlier, in 1990, Arizona authorized the expenditure of $240 million for the 
construction of a baseball stadium expected to add 340 jobs, a cost of $705,800 per 
job.  Id.  Not only does the stadium represent a vast increase in public expenditure 
per job, but it also represents an expenditure for what are arguably less desirable, 
non-manufacturing jobs.  Id. 
 58.  See Robert A. Baade, The Impact of Stadiums and Professional Sports on 
Metropolitan Area Development, 21 GROWTH & CHANGE 1 (1990) (concluding that new 
stadiums have a potentially negative impact on local development and personal 
income).  
 59.  See infra Part III.B (explaining that the Metrodome was built to minimize 
growth around the stadium).  
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actually attend a game during the course of a calendar year.60  Over 
the course of a season, the average baseball team sells 
approximately two million tickets while other sports sell tickets in 
the hundreds of thousands.61  Therefore, although baseball likely 
has the greatest potential for significant spillover effect, this is 
arguably a small effect in a metropolitan area in which many tens of 
thousands of people commute every day to a downtown area to 
work.62 
Second, opponents argue that changes in attendance and the 
distribution of teams further reduces the multiplier effect.63  An 
increase in the popularity of professional sports has created an 
expansion in both the number of cities that have teams and the 
number of individuals who own season tickets.64  Thus, people from 
outside a city are less likely to travel to a specific city to see a game 
because a visit to virtually any large city in the country provides an 
opportunity to see a game.65  And the ability to actually purchase a 
ticket when traveling to a city is reduced, because most of the 
tickets are already in the hands of season ticket holders.66  
Therefore, opponents argue that people who travel to a city and 
attend a game likely travel to the city for alternate purposes such as 
visiting family members or business and would travel to the city 
regardless of the existence of a professional sports franchise.67 
Of greatest concern to opponents of public stadium financing 
are situations in which a stadium is built outside the central area of 
a city.68  Locating a stadium outside the city could theoretically 
                                                 
 60.  Roger G. Noll & Andrew Zimbalist, The Economic Impact of Sports Teams and 
Facilities, in SPORTS, JOBS & TAXES: THE ECONOMIC IMPACT OF SPORTS TEAMS AND 
STADIUMS 55, 57 (Roger G. Noll & Andrew Zimbalist eds., 1997). 
 61. Id. 
 62.  Approximately 165,000 people travel to jobs in downtown Minneapolis 
(population: 385,000) on a daily basis.  Dan Olson, Minneapolis Targets Downtown 
Jams and Neighborhood Speeding, MINNESOTA PUBLIC RADIO, Nov. 2, 2006, http:// 
minnesota.publicradio.org/display/web/2006/10/30/mplstranspo/. 
 63.  See Noll & Zimbalist, supra note 60, at 57. 
 64. Id. at 70. 
 65. Id. 
 66. Id. 
 67. See id. 
 68.  See, e.g., Mark S. Rosentraub, Stadiums and Urban Space, in SPORTS, JOBS & 
TAXES: THE ECONOMIC IMPACT OF SPORTS TEAMS AND STADIUMS 178, 179 (Roger G. 
Noll & Andrew Zimbalist eds., 1997) (stating that current justifications for 
developing stadiums “incorporate a discussion of both the redevelopment efforts 
that can be led or jump-started by ballparks and arenas and the micro-level 
impacts of sports facilities and events on downtown areas”).  
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reduce any possibility of a spillover effect that would benefit the city 
team because people must drive out to isolated areas to attend a 
game.  In a suburban or rural setting, game attendees will be 
unable to walk to local businesses near the stadium to spend their 
money on an after-game beer or plate of chicken wings, and 
instead must spend their additional money on restaurants and 
services offered by the stadium.69  Therefore, any profits that may 
be captured by the community due to the presence of a stadium 
are instead captured by the team owner, who often does not even 
live in the community.  Notably, this is true for the Vikings two 
most recent owners: Red McCombs is from San Antonio, Texas70 
and Zygi Wilf is from New Jersey.71 
Outside of the purely economic arguments, opponents argue 
that funding these stadiums provides an unjust subsidy to the 
wealthy at the expense of the poor.72  If the owner’s purpose in 
building a new stadium is to reap greater profits from higher ticket 
prices, then only wealthier citizens who can pay those higher prices 
will be able to enjoy the new facility.  These residents tend to live in 
suburban areas.73  Therefore, when stadiums are built in the 
downtown area of a city and the taxes are increased in that area, 
the taxes fall on the people with the least ability to enjoy the 
benefits, while those who live outside the area are granted a free 
ride into the new luxury boxes.74  In order to accommodate the 
increased number of luxury boxes and club seats, the number of 
general admission seats must be reduced.  Furthermore, even seats 
that are available at a low cost tend to have a poor view of the field 
in order to ensure the best view to the luxury boxes and club seats 
                                                 
 69. In response to this criticism, many cities have constructed stadiums in 
downtown areas in order to move teams from the suburbs back to downtown and 
maximize the spillover effect.  LEEDS & VON ALLMEN, supra note 30, at 182. 
 70. Jim Souhan, Red, Purple: The Right Mix, STAR TRIB. (Minneapolis), Sept. 6, 
1998, at C10. 
 71. Indeed, every member of the investor group that purchased the Vikings 
from McCombs comes from outside of Minnesota. See Kevin Seifert, Quick Fixes, 
Long-Term Plan, STAR TRIB. (Minneapolis), June 17, 2005, at C1; Kevin Seifert, 
Vikings Notes: Wilf’s True Colors are Purple, Gold, STAR TRIB. (Minneapolis), Aug. 20, 
2005, at C4. 
 72.  See, e.g., Update: Sports-Stadium Funding, ISSUES AND CONTROVERSIES, Aug. 
23, 2004, http://personal.ecu.edu/aldermand/geog2019/stadium_funding_issue 
.html (“Critics also complain that public funding for sports stadiums only makes 
the rich richer at the expense of the common taxpayer.”) 
 73. See LEEDS & VON ALLMEN, supra note 30, at 213. 
 74. Id. 
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that demand a higher price.75  Also, although not directly 
connected to stadium construction, opponents argue that as teams 
rely more and more on cable television rather than network 
television to broadcast their games, middle- and low-income 
families have a more difficult time watching the games, as they 
must either purchase the cable packages, or attend the games.76 
One final argument made by opponents is that, contrary to 
owners’ contentions, on-the-field performance is not enhanced by 
the additional revenues of a new stadium.77  These arguments are 
based on the premise that salary caps limit what an owner can 
spend in most sports, and that even in baseball, which has no salary 
cap, an owner’s primary source of profit is through the local 
television deals.78  Therefore, new stadiums would simply enhance 
the profits of the owners with little change to what type of talent 
they employ.  Some analysts have even indicated that the average 
winning percentages of teams with new, publicly funded sports 
facilities may be lower.79 
D. Arguments Supporting Public Financing of Stadiums 
Like their opponents, supporters of public financing of 
stadiums believe their cause is justified through economic analysis 
and social or community benefits.  Stadium proponents emphasize 
that professional sports teams add substantial wealth to a 
community’s economy, and that stadium construction is necessary 
                                                 
 75. Many times, to accommodate the luxury boxes, the general admissions 
seats get pushed higher and farther back.  For example, in Detroit, one advocate 
explained that the last row of the upper decks of both Tiger Stadium and 
Comiskey Park were closer to the field than the first row of the upper decks in 
both of their replacement stadiums.  Id. at 178–79. 
 76. Id. at 212–13. 
 77.  See, e.g., Taxpayers League of Minnesota, 8 Reasons to Reject Publicly 
Financed Stadiums for Professional Sports Teams, http://www.taxpayersleague.org/ 
NewIssues/stadiums/stadiums.html (last visited Nov. 10, 2006). 
 78. These local television deals no doubt give considerable advantages to 
large market teams.  New York Yankees owner George Steinbrenner was able to 
create an entire television network, the YES network, to broadcast Yankee games.  
Steinbrenner was then able to contract with the local cable companies to carry the 
network at a substantial profit.  See John M. Higgins & Anne Becker, Squeeze Play, 
BROADCASTING & CABLE, Nov. 1, 2004, available at http://www.broadcastingcable 
.com/article/CA476553.html/?display=Top+of+the+Week.  Twins owner Carl 
Pohlad attempted this same business plan when he created Victory Sports.  Id.  
Pohlad’s attempt eventually failed and he sold the Twins broadcasting rights to 
Fox Sports Net North.   Id. 
 79. Smith, supra note 24, at 55. 
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for attracting and retaining these teams.  Proponents also argue 
that professional sports teams bring a sense of civic pride to a 
community that is not quantifiable or allocable to a market system.  
They conclude that government should supply these opportunities.  
Finally, proponents point to alleged problems inherent within 
private financing that cause difficulties for a community, implying 
that these difficulties in private financing justify government 
intervention in order to monitor and regulate stadium 
construction. 
To support the claim that professional sports add considerably 
to the economic health of a community, proponents offer estimates 
of the benefits.80  One commentator has calculated that for every 
single dollar spent on professional sports in a community, an 
additional $1.75 is created and household income rises an 
additional seventeen cents.81  Furthermore, this commentator 
argues that for every $1 million a community spends on 
professional sports, seventy-six jobs are created.82  Most of these 
economic benefits stem from individuals who come from 
communities outside the team’s metro area to attend a game and 
spend money on hotels and dining that otherwise would not be 
spent.83  A supportive example of this phenomenon can be found 
in the Dallas, Fort Worth area, where the consulting firm Coopers 
and Lybrand estimated that spending in the area increased by $239 
million during the first year of the operation of The Ballpark at 
Arlington.84  Of this, $140 million was generated in Arlington.85  
Furthermore, the consulting firm estimated that 5100 jobs were 
created due to the opening of the ballpark.86 
Outside of the spending increases in the community, stadium 
supporters contend that the professional sports teams attract white-
collar business.87  The influx of these businesses stems both from 
the desire of businesses to seek the best and brightest workers and 
                                                 
 80. E.g., Study Estimates $30 Million Annual Boon From Indianapolis NFL Stadium, 
INDIANAPOLIS STAR, Dec. 14, 2004.  
 81. Mayer, supra note 17, at 212 (citing Tom Powell, Influx Of New Stadiums, 
Arenas Will Continue Past 2000: Lonergan, AMUSEMENT BUS., Aug. 18, 1997, at 12). 
 82. Id.  
 83. See id. 
 84. See Senkiewicz, supra note 46, at 581 (describing the revenue streams and 
economic impact of the stadium). 
 85. Id. 
 86. Id. 
 87. See, e.g., Mayer, supra note 17.  
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from the enhanced publicity a city gets from having a sports team.88  
Corporations and other large businesses will locate offices in areas 
that have competitive advantages in luring prospective employees 
away from their competitors.  And a professional sports team is 
simply one more amenity a corporation can offer prospective 
employees.89 This gives any community with a professional sports 
team a natural advantage in attracting and retaining businesses that 
will supply jobs to the community.90  Furthermore, a professional 
sports team gives a city the publicity needed to gain a national 
identity,91 familiarizing business people from around the nation 
with the city.  Therefore, supporters of public stadium financing 
conclude that the increase in white-collar business is a community 
benefit justifying the investment in a stadium, even against claims 
that the stadiums do not directly supply many jobs. 
Stadium proponents also argue that professional sports teams 
provide intangible benefits, unaccounted for by the market 
system.92  These intangible benefits, they argue, further justify 
public expenditures on stadiums to attract and retain teams.  
Ballparks, like a number of activities, such as community recycling 
programs, may not necessarily pass a cost-benefit analysis, but are 
nonetheless socially efficient.93  Professional sports are a social good 
because they foster citizens’ feelings of pride in a city.  The 
existence of this pride94 is evidenced by entire news segments 
devoted specifically to local sports.95  Also, a team’s presence, even 
if not adding economically to the metropolitan area as a whole, 
may provide a social good by helping to revitalize a downtown area.  
In support of this contention, proponents of public financing point 
to Bank One Ballpark in Phoenix and the Gateway Sports and 
Entertainment Complex in Cleveland, both of which have arguably 
                                                 
 88. Id. at 212–13. 
 89. Id. 
 90. Id. (describing benefits associated with public funding of a stadium). 
 91. See Senkiewicz, supra note 46, at 593 (discussing community benefits of a 
new stadium). 
 92. See, e.g., Mike Swift & Dan Haar, Football: Who Really Wins? Stadium’s Value a 
Subjective Matter, HARTFORD COURANT (Conn.), Dec. 8, 1998, at A1 (pointing to a 
proponent’s belief that a new stadium would be a “rebirth” to the city).  
 93. See Allen R. Sanderson, In Defense of New Sports Stadiums, Ballparks and 
Arenas, 10 MARQ. SPORTS L.J. 173, 189 (2000) (framing the argument for new 
stadiums within an externalities analysis). 
 94. See id. at 190 (explaining why sporting events meet traditional public 
goods criteria). 
 95. See id. at 188. 
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helped to revitalize forgotten areas of those communities.96  With 
these arguments, proponents of public financing contend that even 
without a positive economic impact on the community, public 
dollars for stadium construction are still justified.97 
Finally, stadium supporters contend that private funding 
comes with its own problems, problems which would also be felt by 
the entire community.98  One example is the demise of the Oregon 
Arena Corporation (OAC), a privately funded venture led by 
Portland Trailblazers owner Paul Allen, to build a new arena for 
the team.99  After assembling a group of private investors to build a 
new arena, the Rose Garden,100 interest in the team declined, 
pushing attendance down for general admission, club seating, and 
luxury suites.101  Consequently, the Trailblazers were unable to 
make their lease payments.  Although Allen, along with Microsoft 
Corporation co-founder, Bill Gates, bailed the team out with their 
personal fortunes, the OAC eventually was forced to declare 
bankruptcy.102  Consequently, some of these private investors 
became overburdened with debt, affecting the surrounding 
community as businesses in the neighborhood of the arena 
suffered loss of revenues.103  As the OAC lost control of the arena to 
private investors, the Trailblazers suffered further financial 
burdens, affecting the team’s chances to remain in the community.  
In the bankruptcy process, the team lost all revenue from the 
luxury boxes, much of the revenue from higher priced seats, and 
all revenue from the arena’s naming rights.104  Also, the team 
cannot count on securing the best dates for games, potentially 
affecting attendance and television viewership, and has lost the 
                                                 
 96. See Goodman, supra note 21, at 207–208 (discussing evidence that favors 
publicly subsidized sports stadiums).  The Cleveland Gateway Complex consisted 
of the Indians’ new home, Jacobs Field, and the Cavaliers’ new home, Gund Arena 
(renamed Quicken Loans Arena in 2005).  See Cleveland Indians, Ballpark, http:// 
indians.mlb.com/NASApp/mlb/cle/ballpark/cle_ballpark_history.jsp (last visited 
Nov. 17, 2006). 
 97. See Allen R. Sanderson, In Defense of New Sports Stadiums, Ballparks and 
Arenas, 10 MARQ. SPORTS L.J. 173 (2000).  
 98.  See, e.g., Mayer, supra note 17, at 218–24. 
 99. See id. at 219–21 (recounting the history of the OAC and financing for the 
arena). 
 100. Id. at 218 (explaining the purpose and background of the OAC). 
 101. Id. at 222 (listing reasons for the Rose Garden’s drop in revenues). 
 102. Id. at 220 (explaining the circumstances of the OAC bankruptcy). 
 103. Id. at 223. 
 104. Helen Jung, Blazers Also Need Another Kind of Turnaround: Financial, 
OREGONIAN, Mar. 6, 2005, at C10. 
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concessions contract.105  To remedy the situation, the team has 
recently attempted to secure public funding, leaving open the 
option of relocating the team as a bargaining tool.106  Therefore, 
stadium supporters assert that funding stadiums privately can have 
disastrous effects on a community, such that public expenditures 
are justified. 
III.  HISTORY OF STADIUM FINANCING IN MINNESOTA 
Minnesota has, by all accounts, had a difficult time providing 
stadiums for its professional sports franchises.  One commentator 
has suggested that the Twin Cities’ almost “farcical experience with 
sports” positioned it as the “all-time winner in per capita frequency 
of facility construction.”107  Although this criticism speaks to the 
poor economic planning of Twin Cities officials, Minnesota’s 
experience with stadiums has, until recent times, had little to do 
with economic justifications, but rather with social pride.  
Therefore, these criticisms have little hold on the Twin Cities 
unless they can be attached to the community’s concern for civic 
pride.  This section will briefly discuss Minnesota’s history of 
stadium financing via the construction of Minnesota’s two “big 
league” stadiums: Metropolitan Stadium in Bloomington and its 
replacement, the Metrodome, in downtown Minneapolis.  This 
section will also briefly outline the purported justifications behind 
the construction of each stadium, as well as the criticisms and 
difficulties faced by the projects. 
A.  Metropolitan Stadium 
Metropolitan Stadium, or the “Met,” was the Twin Cities’ first 
bona fide major league stadium, even though the stadium was 
actually located in the outskirts of the Twin Cities, in the suburb of 
Bloomington.108  Completed in 1956, the Met had been a four year 
project by several area businessmen who began developing it in July 
of 1952.109  The cost of constructing the stadium was $4.5 million 
                                                 
 105. Helen Jung, Blazers: We Need a Hand to Survive in Portland, OREGONIAN, 
Feb. 24, 2006, at A1. 
 106. Id. 
 107. Noll & Zimbalist, supra note 10, at 4. 
 108. Joe Soucheray, Metropolitan Stadium: The Park Built for Outdoor Baseball, 
http://www.msfc.com/ann_before_metropolitan_stadium.cfm (last visited Nov. 
23, 2005). 
 109. See JAY WEINER, STADIUM GAMES: FIFTY YEARS OF BIG LEAGUE GREED AND 
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and it was paid for entirely by private dollars.110  The project was 
originally developed for the “long-term civic imagery of the 
growing metropolitan area of Minneapolis-St. Paul—and for their 
regional self esteem.”111  The Met was developed, therefore, not to 
promote economic development, but to push Minneapolis and St. 
Paul into the “elite club of major-league cities.”112 
From its very beginnings, the Met had a storied life.  Although 
the Met was built to attract a professional baseball team, it was not 
initially successful.  When the Met opened, it did not attract a team, 
but instead acted as a leverage point for other teams to encourage 
their home cities to build a new stadium under the threat of 
relocation.113  In fact, the first major league team to agree to play in 
the Met was not a baseball team, but rather the NFL’s Minnesota 
Vikings, who began playing in 1961, five years after the Met was 
built.114  But later that same year, the newly acquired Minnesota 
Twins, a transplanted team formerly known as the Washington 
Senators, began to play in the Met.115 
But just a few years after the Vikings and Twins began to play 
in the Met, football’s emerging national prominence encouraged 
other cities to build stadiums better designed for NFL team 
purposes.116  This, combined with the worries of declining cities 
such as Philadelphia, Pittsburgh, Cincinnati, and St. Louis about 
their futures, created an explosion of the new, multi-purpose 
stadiums shared by both NFL and MLB teams.117  This left the Met 
                                                                                                             
BUSH LEAGUE BOONDOGGLES 1–24 (2000) (detailing the historical development 
and financing of the Metrodome). 
 110. Soucheray, supra note 108.   
 111. WEINER, supra note 109, at 1. 
 112. Id. at 61. 
 113. Id. at 24.  During the first five years of the Met’s existence, it was home to 
the minor league Minneapolis Millers.  The Millers were owned by New York 
Giants owner Horace Stoneham.  Because of this, speculation was that 
Minneapolis would become the home of the Giants.  But in 1960, Stoneham 
moved his team to San Francisco, forcing Minneapolis to look elsewhere. 
Soucheray, supra note108.   
 114. WEINER, supra note 109, at 47. 
 115. Id. at 54; Soucheray, supra note 108.   
 116.  See P. Sumner, Sports Spaces in the Age of Modernity, ARCHITECTURE INK, 
http://www.architectureink.com/2002-10/sumner.htm (last visited Nov. 10, 2006) 
(“Running concurrently with the advent of the dome was the design and 
realization of the multi-purpose stadium.  Designed to accommodate both baseball 
and football in the 1960s and 1970s, the landscapes of cities on both coasts and 
points in between were dramatically changed.”)  
 117.  See WEINER, supra note 109. 
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outdated within ten years of its completion: “It was the first time—
but not the last—that Minnesota dropped behind the curve of 
stadium construction . . . [t]he Twin Cities have never led.  They’ve 
always trailed.”118 
To confront this, the Vikings were initially granted permission 
to add seating to the Met.119 But these additions damaged the 
stadium’s architectural integrity, and the Metropolitan Sports 
Council began to discuss whether a new stadium was needed.120  
Despite these additions, the Vikings had the smallest stadium of any 
NFL franchise.121  Therefore, the Vikings helped develop a plan for 
a new, larger facility that would increase their ticket sales.122  
Baseball teams around the country had accepted the new stadiums, 
even if their configuration was not ideal, because of their benefits 
over the older stadiums; the Twins took a similar position.123 
B. The Metrodome 
Like the Met before it, the Metrodome was not built under the 
auspice of an economic benefit.  In the first years of the discussions 
that would eventually lead to the construction of the Metrodome, 
public officials’ plans were met with vigorous opposition by citizens 
who did not want public dollars directed toward a new stadium.124  
Still, public proposals were considered, including a 1972 proposal 
to build a $49.1 million stadium and parking ramp in downtown 
Minneapolis and a proposal to build a stadium in Bloomington to 
keep the teams from leaving for Minneapolis.125  In 1973, one 
thousand people attended a public hearing in Minneapolis to turn 
down the proposed $49.1 million project, seeing it as an 
“unwelcome financial burden” for the city.126  Likewise, St. Paul 
                                                 
 118. Id. at 60–61. 
 119.   Id.  
 120. Id. at 62–63. 
 121.   See WEINER, supra note 109. 
 122. Id. at 63–65. 
 123. Id. at 60–65.  Initially, the Twins pushed for a domed stadium with a 
retractable roof, believing that it would increase attendance by 150,000–200,000 
fans per year.  Id. at 65. 
 124. Id. at 75–76.  The groups that opposed construction of the Metrodome 
were the groups that again led the charge against the new stadium proposals in 
the 1990s and 2000s: anti-tax Republicans and progressives concerned with poverty 
and social stratification.   Id. 
 125. Metropolitan Sports Facilities Commission, History of the Metrodome, 
http://www.msfc.com/history.cfm (last visited Nov. 10, 2006).  
 126. Id. 
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State Senator John Chenoweth considered the new multi-purpose 
stadium “dead” because taxpayers were “unwilling to sign a blank 
check.”127  But concern about this “blank check” was alleviated 
when the Minnesota State Legislature passed a no-site bill, which 
created a commission to develop a stadium.128  This no-site bill 
strictly limited the money that could be spent on a stadium, with 
specific spending limitations conditioned on particular aspects of 
the finalized plan.129  After weighing several proposals,130 the 
commission decided to construct an indoor, domed stadium in 
downtown Minneapolis. 
With such public opposition to the large expenditures 
necessary to build a stadium, it is reasonable to conclude that the 
Metrodome was not seen as an “investment” by the community.131  
That is to say, it was not built under the pretense that it would 
generate economic growth in the surrounding community.  In 
addition to passing the no-site bill limiting what could be spent on 
the stadium, the legislature also conditioned the issuance of bonds 
for the construction of the Metrodome on obtaining a team lease 
sufficient to repay the bonds.132  Therefore, although the legislature 
was willing to float the money necessary to build the Metrodome, it 
wanted the teams to pay the money back, indicating it did not see 
the stadium as an investment that would pay for itself through 
economic development. 
Most interesting is that the Metrodome was specifically built in 
                                                 
 127. Id. 
 128. Id. 
 129. MINN. STAT. § 473.581, subd. 3 (2004).  The commission could spend no 
more than $55 million to build a domed stadium anywhere other than 
Bloomington, $37.5 million to build a new football stadium in Bloomington and 
remodel the Met for baseball, or $25 million to remodel the Met to be a multi-
purpose stadium.  Id. 
 130. The commission received a total of eight stadium proposals.  
Metropolitan Sports Facilities Commission, supra note 125.  Two of these proposals 
came from Minneapolis, one proposal came from Saint Paul, and the suburbs of 
Bloomington, Brooklyn Center, Coon Rapids, and Eagan also offered proposals 
individually.  Id.  There was also a proposal to place a stadium in the “Midway” 
area between St. Paul and Minneapolis.  Id. 
 131. Senator Chenoweth articulated this by framing the stadium dilemma as a 
discussion of how much Minnesota was willing to pay for the Vikings to remain: 
“We're interested in having the Vikings stay, but the question is: what is the price?" 
Id. 
 132. The Metropolitan Sports Facilities Commission was required to execute 
agreements with major league teams to ensure the use of the facilities for a period 
of time long enough to generate revenues to retire the bonds.  See MINN. STAT. § 
473.581, subd. 3(a) (2004). 
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order to minimize growth around the stadium.  Set on the edge of 
downtown, city planners ensured that the Metrodome would not 
create another entertainment district in downtown Minneapolis to 
compete with Hennepin Avenue.133  In fact, only one establishment 
can claim a significant benefit from the presence of the 
Metrodome, the bar Hubert’s, located across the street from the 
stadium.134 
If Minnesota did not build the Metrodome to achieve an 
economic gain, it nonetheless had a purpose behind the 
expenditure.  Several purposes have been suggested.  Indeed, the 
1977 purpose statement, drafted in creating the Metropolitan 
Sports Facilities Commission, stated that the purpose of the new 
facility was to fulfill the metropolitan area’s undefined “need” for 
sports facilities that could not be met by private funding.135  The 
Minnesota Supreme Court determined that the “primary purpose” 
of building the Metrodome was not economic development, but 
rather the creation of an entertainment and recreation option for 
local residents.136  Yet another purpose of developing the 
Metrodome was to shift the focus of the city back to the downtown 
area and boost confidence in the region.137  Therefore, it appears 
that Minnesota built the Metrodome not because it had visions of 
economic gain, but rather because it established a price it was 
willing to pay for a community service. 
                                                 
 133. WEINER, supra note 109, at 71. 
 134. Id. at 72. 
 135. See MINN. STAT. § 473.552(a) (2004). It should be noted that this 
Minnesota statute does claim that the Metrodome promoted the “economic and 
social interests of the metropolitan area.” Id. at (b).  However, this reference to 
both the economic and social interests was added in 1994 when the Minnesota 
State Legislature authorized the public acquisition of the basketball and hockey 
arena in downtown Minneapolis that was the home to the Minnesota 
Timberwolves and the Minnesota North Stars.  Therefore, this language is better 
understood as justification for acquiring this basketball and hockey arena rather 
than justification for construction of the Metrodome.  See MINN. STAT. ANN. § 
473.552(c) (2004). 
 136. Lifteau v. Metro. Sports Facilities Comm’n, 270 N.W.2d 749, 755 (Minn. 
1978).  Although the court noted that a new stadium would provide some 
temporary and permanent jobs and benefits to local businesses, the use of the 
existing stadium by non-sports groups such as alcoholics, the police federation and 
rock fans provided sufficient justification for the stadium beyond economic 
growth. Id. at 754–55. 
 137. WEINER, supra note 109, at 71. 
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IV.  THE NEW VIKINGS STADIUM 
The Minnesota Vikings asked for a new stadium in a difficult 
environment. Earlier in 2005, the Minnesota Twins and Hennepin 
County reached a deal to finance a $478 million dollar baseball-
only stadium; Twins owner Carl Pohlad would pay $125 million and 
the county would finance the remaining expenses through a thirty-
year sales tax increase of 0.15%.138  This plan was contingent upon 
legislative approval of a bill allowing the tax to be imposed in 
Hennepin County without a voter referendum.139  At the same time, 
the University of Minnesota advanced a stadium proposal, which 
was originally set at $235 million dollars, but is now estimated to 
cost more than $248 million due to an increase in the price of 
building products following Hurricane Katrina.140  Thus, with the 
Vikings’ proposal on the table, the legislature was contemplating 
$962.2 million in government spending to build three sports 
stadiums.141  This is daunting for a state that has an annual budget 
of merely $46.6 billion142 and has recently slashed $1.2 billion in 
spending due to budget shortfalls.143 
The Vikings’ difficulty was further enhanced because they were 
asking for public funding to come from the state government, 
unlike the Minnesota Twins, who were merely asking for the state 
to approve a plan in which Hennepin County would finance the 
stadium.144  Furthermore, the money that would come from Anoka 
                                                 
 138. Mike Kaszuba & Dane Smith, Stadium Proposals Jostle for Support, STAR TRIB. 
(Minneapolis), Sept. 25, 2005, at B1; Charley Shaw, Extra Innings for Minnesota 
Legislature?, ST. PAUL LEGAL LEDGER (Minn.), Aug. 25, 2005. 
 139. Duchschere, Smith  & Kaszuba, supra note 9.  Minnesota currently allows 
a county to levy a local sales tax, provided the tax is designated for a specific 
capital improvement and the tax is approved by voters through a general election.  
See MINN. STAT. ANN. § 297A.99, subd. 3 (2004). 
 140. Dane Smith, ‘U’ Stadium Cost Estimate Up $13 Million, STAR TRIB. 
(Minneapolis), Sept. 24, 2005, at B1. 
 141. This calculation was derived by taking the total cost of the Vikings 
development, including road construction costs, and subtracting the $280 million 
proposed contribution from the Vikings.  It then adds $99.2 million for a Gophers 
stadium, which was derived by calculating the 40% state contribution of a $248 
million dollar stadium.  Finally, it adds $353 million for a new Twins stadium, 
which is derived by subtracting the Twins $125 million contribution from the $478 
million estimated cost of the stadium. 
 142. Minnesota Department of Finance, State Budget at a Glance, http:// 
www.budget.state.mn.us/budget/budget_glance.pdf  (last visited Nov. 10, 2006). 
 143. Letter from Peggy Ingison, Minnesota Commissioner of  Finance, to 
Minnesota Governor, Tim Pawlenty (Nov. 19, 2004), http://www.finance.state.mn. 
us/accounting/2004/2004cafr.pdf. 
 144. Press Release, Minnesota Twins, Twins Announce New Ballpark Plan: 
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County in the Vikings’ plan required a larger county-wide sales tax 
than the Twins’ plan required.145 
The Vikings made their task more difficult, however, because 
they advocated for a stadium principally on economic grounds,146 
something not done for either of Minnesota’s previous stadium 
projects.  The benefits listed by Anoka County in support of the 
stadium included the addition of 4300 construction jobs and 
several thousand permanent jobs, the creation of a tourist and 
entertainment destination, the attraction of $1 billion in private 
development, and a strengthened property tax base allowing local 
governments to keep property taxes low.147  Similarly, Ron Jerich, a 
lobbyist for both Anoka County and the Anderson Construction 
Company, a company vying for the construction contract, said: “If I 
was a legislator I’d [build all three stadiums] . . . . You know what 
this is?  That’s jobs – jobs for Minnesotans.”148  Steve Novak, Anoka 
County’s stadium project manager, claims the cost of the stadium 
will be $45 per year for every taxpayer, but that the stadium will 
generate $280 per year for every taxpayer.149  Unlike either the 
Metrodome or the Met before it, the new Vikings’ stadium 
proposal seeks approval because it promises economic 
development for the local community and the state. 
It should also be mentioned that one justification for the new 
                                                                                                             
Collaboration Between Club, Hennepin County (Apr. 25, 2005), http:// 
minnesota.twins.mlb.com/NASApp/mlb/news/search_archive.jsp?c_id=min&cate
gory=pr&month=04&year=2005&pg=1 [hereinafter Press Release, Minnesota 
Twins]. 
 145. While the Twins had advocated for a 0.15% sales tax (fifteen cents per 
$100), the Vikings and Anoka County requested a county sales tax of 0.75% 
(seventy-five cents per $100). See Press Release, Anoka County, Northern Lights 
Minnesota Sports, Retail & Entertainment Center Project Summary Sheet, http:// 
www.co.anoka.mn.us/EconomicDevelopment/stadium/pdf/stadium-project-
summary.pdf [hereinafter Press Release, Anoka County] (last visited Oct. 8, 2006).  
See also Press Release, Anoka County, Anoka County and Vikings Reach Agreement 
(Sept. 20, 2005),  http://www.co.anoka.mn.us/v1_departments/div-governmental-
services/dept-public-information/news-releases/05-09-20-vikings.asp. 
 146. It should be noted that the Vikings have discussed advocating for the 
stadium based on community pride, although they have yet to take a strong 
approach in doing so.  An Anoka County official urged both the Vikings and 
Anoka County to emphasize that the stadium would mean “jobs – pride – [and] 
tax base” for the county.  Mike Kaszuba, Determined Dealmaker, STAR TRIB. 
(Minneapolis), Mar. 1, 2006, at A1. 
 147. Press Release, Anoka County, supra note 145. 
 148. Duchschere, Kaszuba & Smith, supra note 9. 
 149. Sarah McCann, Is Blaine Ready?, STAR TRIB. (Minneapolis), Sept. 21, 2005, 
at N1. 
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stadium offered by Anoka County appears to be in direct conflict 
with Wilf’s intentions not to move the team.  Anoka County has 
indicated that one reason for building the stadium is that if the 
Vikings relocate to another community it will cost Minnesotans 
more money to bring in a new team than it does to simply build a 
stadium to keep the Vikings.150  Previous Vikings owner Red 
McCombs had no qualms with the idea of relocating the team.  In 
contrast, Wilf has been adamant that he will not move the Vikings: 
“We will be in the Minneapolis area forever.”151 
The Vikings may have valid reasons for arguing that the 
stadium will bring economic development, even if the Metrodome 
and the Met did not have such an impact.  The Vikings’ stadium 
proposal is part of a larger plan directed at greater economic 
development, something not true of the Metrodome or the Met.  
Unlike the previous attempt to place the Metrodome in an area 
that would minimize its competition with other entertainment 
destinations, the Vikings and Anoka County have attempted to 
maximize the stadium’s economic impact by incorporating it into 
the existing National Sports Center, which already has facilities for 
soccer, golf, and ice skating.152  Furthermore, the suburban city of 
Blaine, which is the area now under consideration for the site of 
the new stadium, has large open spaces in which to include areas 
for shopping, entertainment, restaurants, housing, and corporate 
space.153  Indeed, the Vikings stadium is justified as the cornerstone 
of a larger $1.5 billion development dubbed the “Northern Lights 
Sports, Retail and Entertainment Center,” which would include a 
public retail and entertainment area extending out of the stadium, 
a corporate center, residential housing, and a wetlands 
preservation area. 154 While Wilf has committed $280 million toward 
the stadium, he also promised further investments to the 
surrounding area that will raise the amount of private investment 
to approximately $1 billion.155  The Vikings and Anoka County see 
                                                 
 150. Among the economic arguments advanced by Anoka County is a Federal 
Reserve Study indicating that communities which recently lost a team are 
consistently willing to spend more money to bring in a new team than they would 
have needed to spend to keep their old team.  Press Release, Anoka County, supra 
note 145. 
 151. WEINER, supra note 109.   
 152. Duchschere, supra note 1. 
 153. McCann, supra note 149. 
 154. Vikings Stadium Plan Aired at Capitol, STAR TRIB. (Minneapolis), Mar. 17, 
2006, http://www.startribune.com/510/story/314673.html . 
 155. Id. 
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these developments as an opportunity to create a larger spillover 
effect for the community as some family members will spend 
Sundays cheering at the Vikings game, while other family members 
will come to shop in the surrounding area.156 
Despite the distinctions between the recent Vikings’ stadium 
proposal and the previous stadiums in Minnesota, the proposal was 
unsuccessful in the 2006 Minnesota State Legislature while the 
proposals by the Twins and the University of Minnesota succeeded.  
This failure is not surprising, however, given the legislature’s 
persistent refusal over the last decade to build a new Vikings 
stadium, in opposition to the persistent advocacy for a stadium on 
behalf of former Vikings owner, Red McCombs. 
V.   SOLUTION FOR THE LEGISLATIVE IMPASSE 
The difficulty that the Vikings have experienced in persuading 
the legislature to build them a football stadium no doubt has a 
strong connection with the simultaneous demands of the Twins 
and the Gophers.  It is not difficult to imagine that three separate 
stadium demands can have the effect of freezing the legislature on 
any one of them; none of the proposals can be decided upon 
without considering the effects that decision would have on the 
other two proposals.  Indeed, Minnesota House Speaker Steve 
Sviggum enunciated this very concern, saying that all of the 
stadium proposals may “die under their own weight”157 and that 
passing bills to construct “three stadiums in one session is a bigger 
bite than many are willing to take.”158 But this did not happen.  
Instead of all of the stadium proposals failing, the Vikings were left 
out of the stadium bonanza that landed the Twins and Gophers 
their new facilities.  This outcome was not particularly surprising to 
those who followed the stadium debates because the Vikings’ hopes 
for a new stadium had consistently been on hold until both the 
Twins’ and Gophers’ stadiums were resolved.159 
This section will first discuss why the Vikings and Anoka 
                                                 
 156. McCann, supra note 149. 
 157. Kaszuba & Smith, supra note 138. 
 158. Vikings Stadium Plan Aired at Capitol, supra note 154. 
 159. See Kaszuba & Smith, supra note 138.  House Speaker Sviggum also 
expressed this belief: "We should try to move ahead incrementally, maybe Gophers 
and Twins first, and the Vikings in two years. “  Id.   Sviggum continued, “I'm not 
saying I'm against a Vikings stadium, but they're a step too far, as far as public 
financing burden.”  Id. 
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County have failed in their attempts to sway both the Minnesota 
State Legislature and the voting public in support of a new stadium.  
Specifically, it will emphasize the Vikings’ failure to use the type of 
arguments that have historically worked in Minnesota as utilized by 
the Twins and Gophers.  Second, this section will present several 
arguments that the Vikings could use to present a more effective 
case for a new stadium. 
A. The Vikings’ Current Failure to Win a Stadium 
The reason for the tepid response from both the legislature 
and the public at large for a Vikings stadium is due in part to the 
Vikings’ inability to effectively push their proposal.  First, the 
Vikings have failed to answer why the Metrodome apparently 
became outdated as quickly as it did.  Second, the Vikings have 
ignored many of the arguments made both for and against new 
stadium construction over the years.  Finally, and most importantly, 
unlike the Twins and the Gophers, the arguments that the Vikings 
have ignored most are the very arguments that have been most 
effective in Minnesota. 
As discussed above, since the construction of the Met, 
Minnesota has consistently fallen behind on the stadium curve.  
One question that the Vikings must answer today is whether 
building another stadium will simply keep Minnesota at the back of 
a new curve.  As one stadium supporter wrote in 2005, “[a]nyone 
who follows sports nationally knows that the Metrodome has been 
obsolete for 15 years, both aesthetically and financially.”160  If this is 
true, the Metrodome became “obsolete” in 1990, less than a decade 
after it opened.  While the Twins and Gophers could hide behind 
the argument that the domed, NFL-size stadium never fit their 
needs particularly well, the Vikings cannot make such an argument, 
because the Metrodome was designed primarily for them.  
Therefore, the Vikings need to answer why this new stadium, which 
would yet again be built at the end of a national stadium frenzy,161 
will not become obsolete for the NFL franchise as quickly as 
Minnesota’s previous stadiums. 
                                                 
 160. Special Session Wanted: Leadership at Capitol, STAR TRIB. (Minneapolis), Sept. 
29, 2005, at A16. 
 161. Between 1992 and 2005, seventeen of the thirty NFL teams have moved or 
were set to move into new stadiums.  Mildred Wigfall Robinson, Public Finance of 
Sports Stadia: Controversial But Permissible…Time for Federal Income Tax Relief for State 
and Local Taxpayers, 1 VA. SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 135, 143 (2002). 
27
Dobson: The Wrong Gameplan: Why the Minnesota Vikings' Failure to Underst
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2006
14. DOBSON - RC - REFORMAT 1.DOC 11/22/2006  10:48:57 AM 
512 WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 33:1 
Furthermore, although economic arguments may have been 
effective in pushing stadium construction in other areas of the 
country, these arguments have been ineffective in Minnesota.  
Indeed, Minnesotans have seen public stadium financing as a 
financial burden.162  Minnesota has built stadiums when either 
private individuals or public officials perceive a social, as opposed 
to economic, benefit. Specifically, these groups have invested in 
new stadiums when they have determined that the stadium will 
enhance the cosmopolitan nature of the Twin Cities. 
Minnesotans see the Twin Cities as their centerpiece for 
cosmopolitan life, briefly and affectionately altering the name of 
the state’s largest city into the “Mini-Apple” to invoke comparisons 
to the “Big Apple” and preaching “that there is more to their city 
than cows, cornfields, and contentment.”163  Due to this pride in the 
cosmopolitan hub, the state has consistently wanted the Twin Cities 
to have “what other big cities had.”164  Consequently, Minnesota has 
built stadiums to maintain a vibrant, cosmopolitan city for which 
the state can take pride, ensuring that the Twin Cities would not be 
“a cold Omaha.”165  Under this framework, the benefit of 
constructing the Met stadium was to bring a team to town and 
establish the Twin Cities as a “major league” city. Likewise, the 
construction of the Metrodome was purposed on bringing the two 
major league teams downtown, establishing the heart of a 
cosmopolitan city.  Even the stadium names cry out to the state, as 
well as the world, that the Twin Cities represents a true 
cosmopolitan metropolis.  Whatever social benefit may exist in 
constructing a new Vikings stadium in Blaine, the Vikings and 
Anoka County have yet to establish one and push it with a sense of 
unity.166 
                                                 
 162.  See supra Part III.B.  
 163. AMY KLOBUCHAR, UNCOVERING THE DOME: WAS THE PUBLIC INTEREST SERVED 
IN MINNESOTA’S 10-YEAR POLITICAL BRAWL OVER THE METRODOME? 6 (1982). 
 164. This desire for what other cities have has not been limited to stadiums.  
During the years before the Metrodome was built, Minneapolis added the Guthrie 
Theater, the Walker Arts Center, and Orchestra Hall, as well as Nicollet Mall 
running through downtown.  Weiner, supra note 109, at 75.  Similarly, in the years 
preceding the 2006 stadium battle, Minneapolis underwent an “arts explosion” in 
which all four of the city’s art museums expanded, the two largest theatre 
companies acquired new venues, and the library received a new downtown 
flagship building.  Tim Bewer, Minneapolis Drawing on Expansions to Fuel Arts 
Explosion, MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL, May 22, 2005, at H1. 
 165. This slogan was made famous by Hubert Humphrey during the debate 
regarding the construction of the Metrodome.  WEINER, supra note 109, at 77. 
 166. It should be noted that Zygi Wilf has pushed the idea of an open-air 
28
William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 33, Iss. 1 [2006], Art. 13
http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol33/iss1/13
14. DOBSON - RC - REFORMAT 1.DOC 11/22/2006  10:48:57 AM 
2006] VIKINGS STADIUM PROPOSAL 513 
Conversely, both the Twins and the Gophers have articulated 
social benefits justifying their requests for new stadiums.  Although 
the Twins proposal has been linked to economic development, the 
Twins have specifically dropped their economic argument 
regarding the stadium, saying: “If there are side benefits, great.  If 
not, so what?”167  Supporters of the Twins stadium argued that 
Major League Baseball is a necessary good for the maintenance of a 
cosmopolitan city.168  Therefore, the threat of losing the Twins 
became vitally important to the Minnesota State Legislature.169  
Beyond simply mitigating against the loss of a team, supporters 
focused the argument on positive aspects of the new stadium for 
the community.  Supporters focused on how the stadium would 
bring “outdoor baseball” back to the Twin Cities and would be a 
centerpiece for the city’s historic Warehouse District.170  Thus, the 
new Twins stadium would both enhance the experience for the 
typical Twins fan, improve the quality of life, and would be a 
                                                                                                             
stadium to give the Vikings a better home field advantage, particularly in the cold 
months, and also to connect with the franchise’s historic roots, no doubt in 
reference to the “Purple People Eaters” that played in the open-air Met stadium.   
See Kevin Seifert, Vikings Ponder Whether to Let Go of Roof Idea, STAR TRIB. 
(Minneapolis), Nov. 30, 2005, at C5.  Conversely, Anoka County has consistently 
advocated that a retractable roof is necessary to make the stadium a year-round 
sports venue.  However, due to the legislature’s concern about the stadium’s 
expense, the Vikings and Anoka County have discussed eliminating the plan for 
the roof in order to save the state the $115 million cost associated with it.  Id.  
 167. This comment was made by Jerry Bell, president of Twins Sports, Inc.  
Mike Meyers, Twins Drop Stadium’s Economic Argument, STAR TRIB. (Minneapolis), 
June 19, 2005, at D1. 
 168. See Patrick Reusse, Gophers Stadium: House, Senate Approve Bill New Field of 
Dreams, STAR TRIB. (Minneapolis), May 21, 2006, at C1 (“A new Twins ballpark will 
be a victory not for intense lobbying but for a city’s health.  Major league sports 
are good.  Period.”) 
 169. The bill authorizing the construction of the new Minnesota Twins 
ballpark stated that “Major League Baseball provides to the state of Minnesota and 
its citizens highly valued intangible benefits that are virtually impossible to 
quantify.”  Act effective May 27, 2006, ch. 257, 2006 Minn. Sess. Law Serv. 393, 
393–406 (West) (providing for financing, construction, and operation of baseball 
stadium) (to be codified at MINN. STAT. § 473.75).  This threat peaked just before 
Minnesota’s 2006 legislative session when a state court judge ruled that the Twins 
did not have to play in the Metrodome following the 2006 season. See Paul Levy, 
Vikings Ride Stadium Momentum, STAR TRIB. (Minneapolis), Apr. 29, 2006, at B1.  
Because of this ruling, Twins owner Carl Pohlad decided to sell the team following 
the season if a stadium bill was not passed.  Had this occurred, the new Twins 
owner would likely have moved the team.  Sid Hartman, Sundays with Sid: Stadium 
Plan was Essential to Keep Twins Safe at Home, STAR TRIB. (Minneapolis), May 21, 
2006, at C2. 
 170. Press Release, Minnesota Twins, supra note 144. 
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stadium that the city, and the state, can take pride in.  This 
contrasts with the Metrodome, which, besides being a relatively 
poor stadium for watching a baseball game, stands as an eyesore in 
the middle of the city. 
Similarly, the Gophers have advocated a social benefit behind 
their new football stadium proposal.  Although the Gophers could 
not use the threat of relocation to push for a stadium, the 
University of Minnesota contended that a new football stadium on 
the university campus would incorporate Saturday games into 
university life in a way that cannot be accommodated by other 
means.171  Thus, the stadium would enhance the university 
experience and create a sense of unity and pride among the 
members of the community.172  By doing so, the stadium would 
help maintain the strong university presence in the state’s largest 
city. 
B. Suggestions for the Vikings’ Stadium Drive 
The supporters of a Vikings stadium have done little to push 
the social benefits that a new stadium proposal would bring.  
Consequently, bills introduced to the Minnesota State Legislature 
for a Vikings stadium have focused heavily on the economic aspects 
of constructing a stadium with the only social benefit being that of 
keeping the team.173  For those groups to be successful in their push 
for a new stadium, they need to offer Minnesota a reason to build 
the stadium other than economic development, and they must 
integrate the need for a Vikings stadium into the cosmopolitan 
character of the Twin Cities.  This may take some creativity on the 
part of these groups, but arguments on their behalf do exist. 
First, the Vikings may push the stadium in the same way the 
Twins have pushed their proposed stadium, as a stadium of which 
                                                 
 171. University of Minnesota, Why a Stadium: An Opportunity of a Lifetime, (Jan. 
11, 2006), http://www.umn.edu/stadium/why.html.   
 172. Id.  This argument worked especially well.  Prior to signing the bill, 
Minnesota Governor Tim Pawlenty expressed his excitement for the new game-day 
atmosphere that the stadium would create: “We’ll have that band marching down 
University Avenue on Saturday afternoons again.”  Reusse, supra note 46.   
 173. See H.F. 2295, 84th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Minn. 2005).  According to the 
legislature, the new stadium in Blaine serves a public purpose by “retaining the 
Minnesota Vikings as a part of Minnesota's public amenities for its citizens and as a 
major attraction to visitors to the state,” thereby “adding to the economic 
development of the state, Anoka County, and surrounding communities, 
attracting revenue from out of the state, and preserving the contributions of 
football to the culture of Minnesota and to the enjoyment of its citizens.”  Id. § 2. 
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the state can be proud and as a facility that returns outdoor 
athletics to Minnesota.  Indeed, this is an argument that Zygi Wilf 
has voiced periodically, although it has been lost due to Anoka 
County’s push for a retractable roof.174  By promising to bring 
outdoor football back to Minnesota, the Vikings have a chance to 
capitalize on the local pride of a rugged Minnesota football team 
representing the frigid state in the way that the Green Bay Packers 
and Chicago Bears represent their communities, as opposed to a 
team coddled from the cold weather in a temperature-controlled 
environment.  But this argument loses its traction when the 
proposal requires a retractable roof to protect the team and 
spectators from Minnesota’s harsh winter weather. 
Another potential argument for the Vikings is that their new 
stadium will help to establish an identity for a relatively forgotten 
suburban area.  Although a recent development boom has allowed 
many parts of Blaine to escape the town’s former distinction as a 
blue-collar, post-War suburb, Blaine and the northern metro 
suburbs have yet to establish an identity.175  With a topography that 
lacks the lakes common to other sections of the Minneapolis 
metropolitan area, the National Sports Center has arguably created 
an identity for Blaine.176  In this way, the Vikings are not promising 
that the stadium will help to spur growth in the surrounding area 
because the surrounding area will grow regardless of the existence 
of a stadium.  Rather, the Vikings are offering what would be the 
crown jewel of the National Sports Center, solidifying a proverbial 
“place on the map” for Blaine and other northern metro suburbs 
while creating a new district for the city.  If the Metrodome was 
placed in downtown during the 1970s to be a confidence booster 
for the city, it is not unthinkable that in 2006, after more than 
twenty years of urban development, it is now preferable to put a 
stadium in Blaine to enhance the metropolitan area.  For, as the 
state found alternative purposes for the Metrodome, it is certainly 
possible that the state may now determine it desirable to serve these 
and other purposes in the north metro area. 
Finally, the Vikings and Anoka County would be well advised 
to advance the same arguments in support of a stadium.  Presently, 
Vikings owner Zygi Wilf has attempted to endear himself to a 
                                                 
 174. Seifert, supra note 71. 
 175. See Bob Shaw, Blaine Goes Boom, ST. PAUL PIONEER PRESS (Minn.), Sept. 26, 
2004, at C1. 
 176. See id. 
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community that was frustrated by Red McCombs’s consistent 
threats that if he did not get a stadium, he would relocate the team 
to increase his own profits.  In doing so, Wilf has specifically 
promised not to move the team.177  This may damage Wilf’s 
bargaining power, as the state may determine that while having a 
professional football team is an aspect of maintaining a 
cosmopolitan city, the construction of a new stadium is pointless if 
the team has decided not to relocate.  Consequently, Wilf’s position 
is risky and will be effective only if he can carve a path that builds a 
strong relationship between the community and the team, thereby 
promoting the community pride in the team that might turn public 
sentiment in favor of constructing a new stadium.  According to 
Wilf, “this is not a matter of economics, this is a matter of 
passion”178 and it should be a matter of passion for the community 
as well.  Conversely, Anoka County, in its push to justify the stadium 
economically, has implied that the Vikings may relocate.179  By 
implying that the Vikings might relocate, Anoka County may be 
attempting to suggest that the team’s departure could threaten the 
cosmopolitan nature of Minnesota’s only “major league” city.  But 
this suggestion may be harmful to the county’s ultimate goal—not 
only does it conjure up memories of McCombs’s previous threats, 
potentially angering the community into rejecting a stadium out of 
spite, but it also stands in direct contrast with Wilf’s promises.  The 
citizens and legislators are forced to wonder whether Wilf’s 
promises are truthful or whether Anoka County officials are simply 
ignoring them to make what they perceive to be a stronger 
argument.  Regardless of whether the citizens believe Wilf’s 
comments or Anoka County’s implications, the inconsistency can 
do nothing but damage relations with the state, forcing officials to 
base their arguments more and more on the economic 
development promises that have been unsuccessful in Minnesota. 
By focusing on the economic arguments that Minnesota has 
historically failed to recognize, the Vikings and Anoka County have 
done little to ensure their acquisition of a new stadium.  
                                                 
 177. See Weiner, supra note 109.  See also Sean Jensen, Vikings Sale OK’d, ST. 
PAUL PIONEER PRESS (Minn.), May 26, 2005, at A1. 
 178. Weiner, supra note 7. 
 179. Interestingly, Minnesota Governor Tim Pawlenty used the relocation 
argument to advocate for stadiums, but on the social grounds of retaining the 
teams.  Referring to the stadium hopes of both the Twins and the Vikings, 
Pawlenty said: “It is not necessarily a dollar-for-dollar direct economic value . . . . 
But as an overall goal, keeping the teams here has value.”  Smith, supra note 140. 
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Furthermore, they have denied Minnesotans a valuable civic 
debate.  While the Vikings will likely receive a new stadium within 
the next few years from the growing threat that, despite Wilf’s 
statements to the contrary, they may relocate and damage the 
cosmopolitan nature of the city,180 the benefit that this speculation 
will bring them is valuable only to the degree that it will secure the 
minimum financial support needed to keep the team in Minnesota.  
Therefore, the stadium will likely be similar to what the Metrodome 
was when it opened: inexpensive, but new.   
By redirecting the debate to the social benefits of a new 
stadium, the state will have the opportunity to determine whether 
something more than simply keeping the team should be weighed 
against the costs of a stadium.  This will only help the Vikings’ 
chances.  If, through debate, Minnesota determines that the costs 
of a stadium outweigh the benefits of keeping the team for a 
cosmopolitan community, the Vikings will not likely get their 
stadium.  But if Minnesota is not presented with the opportunity to 
truthfully evaluate the social benefits of a new stadium against its 
costs, not only will the Vikings lose their stadium bid, but 
Minnesota might lose an opportunity to establish a facility for 






                                                 
 180. The Vikings are contractually obligated to play in the Metrodome until 
2011, at which point the team could relocate.  Levy, supra note 169.  Indeed, the 
bill that granted the Twins their new stadium alluded to the possibility of a future 
Vikings stadium.  It ordered Anoka County and the Vikings to develop a stadium 
proposal with a retractable roof and submit a report of that proposal to the 
legislature by January 15, 2007. See Act effective May 25, 2006, ch. 247, 2006 Minn. 
Sess. Law Serv. 274, 274–78 (West) (providing funding and conditions for the 
University of Minnesota football stadium); Act effective May 27, 2006, ch. 257, 
2006 Minn. Sess. Law Serv. 393 (providing for financing, construction, and 
operation of baseball stadium).  Furthermore, the legislature authorized Anoka 
County to impose the 0.75% sales tax if and when the legislature approves a plan 
for the Vikings stadium in the coming years. Act effective May 27, 2006, ch. 257 § 
21, 2006 Minn. Sess. Law Serv. 393, 406 (West).  But due to the Vikings’ failure to 
secure a stadium in the 2006 legislature, Wilf has begun to consider options of 
renovating the Metrodome now, that the Vikings will be the stadium’s only tenant. 
See Sid Hartman, Costs May Prompt Wilf to Weigh Feasibility of Upgrading Dome, STAR 
TRIB. (Minneapolis), May 25, 2006, at C3. 
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